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THE POWER OF THE STATE TO RESTRICT THE
USE OF REAL PROPERTY.
While we at this date have a somewhat concrete idea of
what we think the constitution means, the history of that
instrument and the decisions of the courts clearly show that
at its writing neither its authors nor the people approving it
realized the possibilities in its legal development by court
construction. This article involves the construction of
phrases that even the highest court of the land has hesitated
to define and which were undefined in our constitution.
Incident only to the construction of these phrases is involved
the legislative power, the power of the representatives of the
people to pass laws affecting the public welfare.
We assume that our readers are, many of them, too busy
to have given time to a collation of the decisions upon this
subject. We shall therefore give a slight history of the sub-
ject, cite provisions of the national constitution with the
early decisions of the United States Supreme Court, the deci-
sions of many of the state courts, and finally, give in brief our
own views upon the subject.
It is probably unnecessary to call attention to the fact that
our American constitutions have been continually construed,
insofar as they affect property rights, only as instruments of
limitation, and that when the legislative action encroaches
upon property rights, the only protection of the individual is
the limitations of our constitutions.
The people of a state vote, in the adoption of their con-
stitution, up6n their form of government. They include in
their own constitution certain limitations upon the govern-
ment which they create. They have uniformly adopted repre-
sentative forms of government, in which they delegate to
their representatives the authority to prescribe their rules o'f
action. According, then, to established principles of con-
struction, the action of that law-making body is valid unless
it is a plain and vital encroachment upon some provision of the
protecting instrument, the constituttion.
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Under consideration of the phrase, "due process of law",
has arisen the question of the validity of nearly every legisla-
tive act claimed to be an encroachment upon private right.
The justices of the highest court in the land have differed at
times as to the history and meaning of the phrase. Is it any
wonder, therefore, that state courts and minor courts are con-
fused? Is it any wonder that legislative bodies have some-
times over-stepped the boundaries of what the courts consid-
ered "due process of law"?
The states have almost uniformly adopted provisions
similar to the provisions of the national constitution under
discussion, so that the construction of these provisions of the
national constitution is decisive of the corresponding provi-
sions of most of the state constitutions.
At the adoption of the federal constitution the only provi-
sion of that instrument which could possibly be construed as
a limitation upon the power of the state legislature to restrict
the use of property was article 5 of the amendments, which
reads as follows:
"No person shall be held to answer for a capital or other-
wise intamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of
a grand jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval forces,
or in the militia, when in actual service in time of war or
public danger; nor shall any person be subject for the same
offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall
be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against
himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without
due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for
public use, without just compensation."
But this was held in the case of Barron v. Baltimore,' inso-
far as it affects the question under discussion, to be a restric-
tion upon the government of the United States only and not a
limitation upon the power of the states.
In 1866, the fourteenth amendment was added to the
constitution, and section 1 thereof, insofar as it affects the
subject under discussion, provides as follows :
"No state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge
the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States;
nor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or prop-
erty, without due process of law; nor deny to any person with-
in its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."
1. (1833) 7 Pet. 242.
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The provisions of this article were immediately presented
to the Supreme Court of the United States for construction, in
many cases, where persons claimed to have been denied due
process of law and the equal protection of the law by the
states. It then became necessary to construe these phrases
upon a variety of subjects. In one case decided by the United
States Supreme Court, Murray v. Hoboken Land Co.,2 Justice
Curtis gave what he considered the history and limits of "due
process of law". In a subsequent decision, Davidson v. New
Orleans,3 Justice Miller of the same court differed- as to the
history of the phrase and its effect upon 'American institu-
tions and differed as to its limits.
If there had been anything valuable in English decisions
or in English law upon the subject under discussion, the
American courts would have had a comparatively easy task
in the construction of the phrase, as applied to cases involving
restriction upon the use of property; but in England the
power of parliament was nearly absolute and was for the most
part unquestioned. Most of the colonies existed under royal
grant where the title to property and control over it was orig-
inally in the crown. The restrictions which were included in
the American constitutions, national and state, upon the
powers of the law-making body find no precedent in the
English law for their construction. Hannis Taylor in his
work on "The Origin and Growth of the American Constitu-
tion", (p. 105), says that "the right of the court to annul the
act of the state when in its judgment the limitations imposed
by the constitution have been exceeded is an American inven-
tion".
To consider, briefly, the form of government adopted and
method of its adoption, it would seem that the people of the
state should abide by, and the courts should uphold as much
as possible, the action of the law-making body, and the courts
do unquestionably uphold to a considerable extent its action.
When the people of the state draft a constitution, they im-
pliedly agree that upon its adoption they shall perpetually be
bound by its terms; in that instrument they commit them-
selves to a form of government wherein representatives,
elected by themselves, shall make all laws to promote the
2. (1855) 18 How. 272.
3. (1877) 96 U. S. 97.
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general welfare. If it becomes necessary, in order to promote
the general welfare, to pass laws restricting the use of prop-
erty, why should the people not abide by the judgment of
their law-making body?
As already stated, the fourteenth amendment to the
national constitution contains the limitations upon the right of
the states to pass laws considered in this article. The Min-
nesota constitution, section 13, article 1, provides: "Private
property shall not be taken, destroyed or damaged for public
use without just compensation therefor first paid or secured."
Other state constitutions contain substantially the same pro-
vision. These provisions were undoubtedly included in the
state constitution as an element of "due process of law".. The
fourteenth amendment to the national constitution and these
state provisions are generally considered together, but the
decisions have usually considered the general subject rather
than the specific provisions.
In construing the fourteenth amendment the courts very
early recognized the necessity of a rule whereby the progress
of law should be unhampered, and the action of the law-
making body, when for the evident welfare of the state, upheld.
As to restrictions upon the use of property, the difficulty arose
in establishing a rule whereby one restriction might be upheld
and another declared invalid. From the application of the
rule which was adopted has come the confusion upon the
subject.
The man who owned and conducted a business devoted to
the sale of intoxicating liquors contended that he was pro-
tected by the fourteenth amendment, and that when a state
legislature passed a law prohibiting the sale of intoxicating
liquor within certain territory, he was denied due process of
law and his property was taken for public use without com-
pensation. His argument seemed a good one. His contention
certainly was a basis for argument, in the absence of the con-
struction which the courts have placed upon this clause of the
constitution; and comparing his contention with similar cases
in which the construction placed upon this clause has been
different, we cannot but feel that perhaps there is some incon-
sistency in the positions taken by our courts. Suppose the
legislature of the state of Minnesota decides in its wisdom that
the use of coffee is harmful to the inhabitants of the state and
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prohibits the sale of coffee within the state; how quickly would
merchants claim protection of this clause of the constitution.
And yet, in the absence of judicial construction and judicial
precedent,--viewed without prejudice-in what way is this
question different from that presented to the court when a
legislature for the first time prohibited the sale of intoxicating
liquor? This comparison is offered only to emphasize the ques-
tion which presented itself at the time the court was first called
upon to construe the national constitution upon this subject,
and to emphasize the contention of the author that the whole
subject is one of degree in representative action, and that it
sometimes seems that one degree is as reasonable as the other.
The moment the court gives judicial approval to a particular
degree in advance, that degree becomes and seems as reason-
able as those previously approved.
An early decision by the Supreme Court of the United
States in construing this clause of the national constitution
opened a field for construction by the national and state courts
that appears to be limitless and seems to give force to the con-
tention that it is only a question of degree. This decision was
that "All rights are held subject to the police power of a state;
and if the public safety or the public morals require the dis-
continuance of any manufacture or traffic, the legislature may
provide for its discontinuance, notwithstanding individuals
or corporations may thereby suffer inconvenience". 4 This im-
mediately injected into the construction of our national con-
stitution a principle which has since been used in hundreds,
perhaps thousands, of cases, and which had no mention in the
constitution, but was the child of necessity. The term, police
power, was not included in our constitution or defined else-
where, and will be indefinable until a complete change shall
have taken place in our form of government. By injecting this
principle into our jurisprudence, the court made possible a
construction capable of sustaining the validity of nearly every
act of our representative lawmakers. It must have seemed
necessary at that time to do so; and if we adopt the theory
that this is entirely a representative government,-a govern-
ment by the- majority, for the benefit of the majority,--it was
just.
4. Beer Co. v. Massachusetts, (1877) 97 U. S. 32.
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The court said in this case:
"If the public safety or the public morals require the dis-
continuance of any manufacture or traffic, the hand of the leg-
islature cannot be stayed from providing for its discontinu-
ance, by any incidental inconvenience which individuals or
corporations may suffer. All rights are held subject to the
police power of the state."
"Whatever differences of opinion may exist as to the extent
and boundaries of the police power, and however difficult it
may be to render a satisfactory definition of it, there seems
to be no doubt that it does extend to the protection of the
lives, health and property of the citizens and to the preserva-
tion of good order and the public morals."
This decision followed a very extended discussion of the
entire subject in the Slaughter House Cases,5 in which was
introduced the principle which we believe should be and is the
basis of all such legislation, that
"Every person ought so to use his property as not to injure
his neighbor; and that private interests must be made subser-
vient to the general interests of the community."
The court says on page 62 of this decision:
"'Unwholesome trades, slaughter-houses, operations offen-
sive to the senses, the deposit of powder, the application of
steam power to propel cars, the building with combustible ma-
terials, and the burial of the dead, may all,' says Chancellor
Kent, 'be interdicted by law, in the midst of dense masses of
population, on the general and rational principle,- that every
person ought so to use his property as not to injure his neigh-
bors; and that private interest must be made subservient to the
general interests of the community.' This is called the police
power; and it is declared by Chief Justice Shaw that it is much
easier to perceive and realize the existence and sources of it
than to mark its boundaries, or prescribe limits to its exercise.
"This power is, and must be from its very nature, incapable
of any very exact definition or limitation. Upon it depends
the security of social order, the life and health of the citizen,
the comfort of an existence in a thickly populated community,
the enjoyment of private and social life, and the beneficial
use of property. 'It extends,' says another eminent judge, 'to
the protection of the lives, limbs, health, comfort and quiet
of all persons, and the protection of all property within the
state; * * * and persons and property are subjected to all
kinds of restraints and burdens in order to secure.the general
comfort, health, and prosperity of the state. Of the perfect
right of the legislature to do this no question ever was, or, up-
5. (1872) 16 Wall. 36.
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on acknowledged general principles, ever can be made, so far
as natural persons are concerned."
The language employed in this case shows that this so-
called principle, police power, is the basis for the courts' con-
struction of this clause of the constitution and was necessary,
as the court says, for the "protection of the lives, limbs, health,
comfort and quiet of all persons and the protection of all
property within the state."
While this decision seemed somewhat arbitrary at the
time, and there were three dissenting opinions by eminent
jurists, it is submitted that it was a construction in accord
with the compact which was entered into by and between the
people of the colonies, which cannot be anything else but a
compact agreeing to representative government,-and agreeing
to the rule of the majority-ahd which we call our constitution.
This decision was broad enough to sustain any subsequent act
of our representatives along these lines and was clear and con-
vincing evidence that the great court which gave this decision
believed this to be a government dedicated to the rule of the
majority.
It cites approvingly the Massachusetts case of Commonwealth
v. Alger,6 and it is interesting to note how well defined in the
mind of the Massachusetts court was the principle that people
hold their property subject to such restraints and regulations
as may be imposed by the legislature, for it said, (pp. 84
and 85) :
"We think it is a settled principle, growing out of the nature
of well ordered civil society, that every holder of property,
however absolute and unqualified may be his title, holds it
under the implied liability that his use of it may be so regu-
lated, that it shall not be injurious to the equal enjoyment
of others having an equal right to the enjoyment of their
property, nor injurious to the rights of the community.
All property in this commonwealth, as well that in the interior
as that bordering on tide waters, is derived directly or indirect-
ly from the government, and held subject to those general reg-
ulations, which are necessary to the common good and general
welfare. Rights of property, like all other social and con-
ventional rights, are subject to such reasonable limitations
in their enjoyment, as shall prevent them from being injurious,
and to such reasonable restraints and regulations established
by law, as the legislature, under the governing and controlling
6. (1862) 7 Cush. (Mass.) 53.
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power vested in them by the constitution, may think necessary
and expedient.
"This is very different from the right of eminent domain, the
right of a government to take and appropriate private property
to public use, whenever the public exigency requires it; which
can be done only on condition of providing a reasonable com-
pensation therefor. The power we allude to is rather the po-
lice power, the power vested in the legislature by the constitu-
tion, to make, ordain and establish all manner of wholesome
and reasonable laws, statutes and ordinances, either with pen-
alties or without, not repugnant to the constitution, as they
shall judge to be for the good and welfare of the common-
wealth, and of the subjects of the same."
In the case of Thorpe v. The Rutland and Burlington Rail-
road Company7 the Vermont court also had recognized the so-
called police power and extended it to the protection of lives,
limbs, health and comfort of all persons and all property. The
court said (p. 149):
"This police power of the state extends to the protection
of the lives, limbs, health, comfort, and quiet of all persons,
and the protection of all property within the state. Accord-
ing to the maxim, sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas, which
being of universal application, it must, of course, be within the
range of legislative action to define the mode and manner in
which every one may so use his own as not to injure others."
Immediately upon the establishment of the principle of
police power as justification for legislative action regulating
the lives and property of individuals and corporations, where
the legislative act resulted in pecuniary loss to the individual
or in the restriction of his use of property, the courts began
to extend this doctrine as a justification for legislative action
upon other subjects where it resulted in damage to the per-
son contesting the validity of the act.
At this point we wish to call attention to a distinction that
might have been made upon the adoption of this indefinable
principle, the police power, which would have prevented much
of the confusion that has resulted not only in the public mind,
but apparently in some of the courts, as to the limit of the
power. If the courts had said the police power as exercised
by the state extends to the protection of the life, health and
morals of the people of the community and had not extended
the principle to the protection of property, a line of demarca-
tion would have been drawn which could have been subse-
7. (1854) 27 Vt. 140.
STATE RESTRICTIONS ON USE OF PROPERTY 143
quently followed without confusion. But as we follow down
the cases hereinafter cited, the reader will observe that legis-
lative action protective of property as well as of life, health
and morals, is upheld. From that results the confusion. The
prohibition of the sale of intoxicating liquor was unquestion-
ably justified on the ground of public health and public morals.
The restriction of slaughter houses. to particular districts was
justified upon the ground of protection of public health; the
prohibition of the building of wooden buildings in fire limits,
and the restriction of gun powder factories, etc., upon the
ground of protection of life and safety.
We are not arguing that the police power should stop
where it is, but merely that in the application of this rule,
which has always been more or less arbitrary, a line might
have been drawn upon which could have been based more logi-
cal distinctions; but with the injection of the idea of protec-
tion of property into the principle has come confusion. Per-
haps the adoption of this additional principle was not improp-
er, but confusion was inevitable.
After the decision of the above mentioned cases by the Su-
preme Court of the United States came the case of Butchers'
Union Slaughter House Co. v. Crescent City Landing & Slaugh-
ter Co.,3 where it was held:
"The power of a state legislature to make a contract of such
character that under the provisions of the constitution it can-
not be modified or abrogated, does not extend to the subjects
affecting public welfare or public morals so as to limit the
power to legislate on these subjects to the prejudice of the
general welfare."
In that case an exclusive privilege had been given one
slaughter house company by the legislature, and by another
act of the legislature a privilege was also granted to another
company. The court held that the first privilege even though
granted by the legislative body as an exclusive privilege, was
not binding upon the state, as the state could not contract
away its police power or its power to legislate upon a subject
affecting the public health, morals, safety or prosperity.
In the earlier case of Beer Co. v. Massachusetts9 some
doubt had been expressed as to the validity of a legislative en-
actment prohibiting the sale and manufacture of intoxicating
8. (1883) 111 U. S. 746.
9. Supra.
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liquor, where property was already owned and used in the
business prohibited, but this question was definitely settled
by the case of Mugler v. Kansas,0 in which the court held:
"Lawful state legislation, in the exercise of the police power
of the state to prohibit the manufacture and sale, within the
state, of spirituous, malt, vinous, fermented or other intoxicat-
ing liquors to be used as a beverage, may be enforced against
persons who at the time happen to own property whose chief
value consists in its fitness for such manufacturing purposes,
without compensating them for the diminution in its value re-
sulting from such prohibitory enactments."
From these early cases upon the subjects of intoxicating
liquor, slaughter houses, etc., began to grow the legislation
upon other subjects, similar, but harmful to the public health,
morals and prosperity in a lesser degree than these.
In the case of L'Hote v. New Orleans," the United States
Supreme Court again approved the principle that damage to
property in the exercise of the police power was not such
damage as required compensation under this clause of the
national constitution. The court said:
"The truth is that the exercise of the police power often
works pecuniary injury, but the settled rule of this court is that
the mere fact of the pecuniary injury does not warrant the
overthrow of legislation of a police character." I
And very recently the United States Supreme Court, in the
case of Reinman v. Little Rock,' 2 had to determine the valid-
ity of an ordinance of Little Rock prohibiting the maintenance
of a livery stable in the city of Little Rock. The case was one
where a livery stable had already been constructed. The
court held:
"Even though a livery stable is not a nuisance per se it is
within the police power of the state to regulate the business
and to declare a livery stable to be a nuisance in fact and in
law, in particular circumstances and particular places. If such
power is not exercised arbitrarily or with unjust discrimina-
tion, it does not impinge upon the rights guaranteed by the
14th amendment. * * * The ordinance of the City of Lit-
tle Rock, Arkansas, making it unlawful to conduct the busi-
ness of a livery stable in certain defined portions of that city,
is not unconstitutional as depriving an owner of a livery
stable already established within that district of his property
10. (1887) 123 U. S. 623.
11. (1899) 177 U. S. 587, 20 S. C. R. 788.
12. (1914) 237 U. S. 171, 35 S. C. R. 511.
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without due process of law or as denying him equal protec-
tion of the law."
In reliance upon these cases legislation was extended to
other businesses which might not be nuisances per se but
which might be so by reason of their situation-such as laun-
dries, tanneries, soap factories, brick kilns, stables, public
garages, lumber yards; and state decisions, based upon previ-
ous holdings involving liquor cases, slaughter houses, etc.,
began to uphold legislation of this character. The legislation
upon these subjects soon extended to bill-boards, height of
buildings, lot lines, etc. As soon, however, as legislation was
enacted regulating the height of buildings, lot lines, bill-boards,
etc., the argument was advanced that the considerations for
such legislation were purely esthetic and that it was not
based upon the protection of public health, morals, safety or
welfare. This introduced a new element of confusion into
the decisions upon the subject, for the decision of a court ap-
proving legislation prohibiting a brickyard within certain dis-
tricts was very hard to distinguish from the case where any
form of building was prohibited. It is rather difficult to con-
ceive of any consideration in the prohibition of the building of
a brickyard in a certain locality other than the esthetic and the
property consideration. To show the confusion which has
resulted from a great mass of state decisions upon the sub-
ject, we shall briefly outline the state decisions and follow
them with decisions of the United States Supreme Court, in
which it is interesting to observe that the latter court in
no important case has denied to the state the right to regulate
or prohibit any business which it has seen fit to regulate of
prohibit.
In the case of In re Montgomery,13 the California supreme
court held:-
"An ordinance of the city of Los Angeles dividing the terri-
tory including the municipality into industrial and residential
districts and prohibiting the maintenance or conduct, within
the residential districts, of any stone crusher, rolling mill,
machine shop, planing mill, carpet beating establishment, hay
barn, wood yard, lumber yard, public laundry or wash house,
is a legitimate and constitutional exercise of the police power
of the city."
13. (1912) 163 Cal. 457, 125 Pac. 1070, Ann. Cas. 1914 A 130.
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This case involved the building of a lumber yard within
a prohibited district. Even though the prohibition of the
building of a lumber yard might, under some circumstances,
be justified for fire reasons, yet the reason running through
the case appears to be principally that the lumber yard was
being built in a residence district. The court. however, appar-
ently to base its decision as much as possible upon substan-
tial grounds, said in conclusion:
"While a lumber yard is not per se a nuisance, it takes no
extended argument to convince one that in a residence district
such a place may be a menace to the safety of the property in
its neighborhood for various reasons, among which may be
mentioned the inflammable nature of the materials kept there."
In the case of Ex parte Quong Wo, 14 the same court up-
held the validity of an ordinance of Los Angeles prohibiting
laundries within a certain district. In the case of Ex parte Huda-
check,15 it also held:
"The city of Los Angeles has authority, in the exercise of its
police power, to regulate the business of brick making, by re-
stricting the location within the city limits in which it may be
followed. It is immaterial to the right of regulation of such
business that the conduct of such business is not a nuisance."
The court further said:
"The reasonableness of a municipal restriction prohibiting
the carrying on of the manufacture of brick within a specified
portion of the city is sufficiently established when, in addition
to the presumption in favor of the propriety of the legislative
determination, there is evidence tending to show that the
region in question had become primarily a residence district
and that occupants of neighboring dwellings were seriously
discommoded by the operations of the business."
An examination of the opinion will show that this case
justifies the exercise of the police power to a great extent upon
aesthetic considerations, while not so naming them.
In the case of State v. Gurry,'6 it was held by the Maryland
Supreme Court that the city of Baltimore had authority to
pass an ordinance segregating the races.
In the case of State v. Taubert,17 an ordinance of the city of
Minneapolis prohibiting tanneries within a certain district
was upheld. In this case the Minnesota Supreme Court said:
14. (1911) 161 Cal. 220, 118 Pac. 714.
15. (1913) 165 Cal. 416, 132 Pac. 584.
16. (1913) 121 Md. 534, 88 AtI. 228, Ann. Cas. 1915 B 957.
17. (1914) 126 Minn. 371, 148 N. W. 281.
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"The varying circumstances and conditions to be taken
into account cannot be accurately anticipated in advance, and
uniform and unvarying restrictions previously prescribed are
liable to prove inadequate or inapplicable."
In the case of State v. Withnell,18 the Nebraska court held
an ordinance forbidding the construction of brick kilns in a
city to be a valid exercise of the police power, saying:
"Within constitutional limits, private property is held sub-
ject to proper and general welfare of the people."
In the case of People ex rel. Busching v. Ericsson,0 an act
of the Illinois legislature giving cities and villages authority
to regulate the location of public garages was declared valid
and an action of a municipality pursuant thereto was sus-
tained. The Illinois Supreme Court held:
"In the exercise of the police power, the legislature may au-
thorize municipalities of the state to direct the location and
regulate the use and construction of public garages, for the
business of conducting a public garage may become a nuisance
when conducted in particular localities and under certain con-
ditions, although such a business is not a nuisance per se."
"Also an ordinance directing the location and regulating the
construction and use of public garages is not unreasonable
which prohibits the construction of a garage within 200 feet of
a church and requires the written consent of a majority of the
property owners in case the location of the garage is to be
in a strictly residential district."
In the case of People ex rel. Keller v. Village of Oak Park,20
the same court held:
"Under the cities and villages act as amended in 1911, cities
are granted express power to direct the location of public
garages, and an ordinance which prohibits the construction or
maintenance of a public garage on any site where two-thirds
of the buildings within a radius of 500 feet are used exclusively
for residence purposes, without the consent of the majority
of the property owners according to frontage, within such
radius, is not void for unreasonableness, * * * and it is
incumbent upon a party attacking the ordinance as unreason-
able to show affirmatively and clearly that it is so."
In the case of Attorney General v. Williams,21 an act of
the Massachusetts legislature entitled "An act relating to the
18. (1912) 91 Neb. 101, 135 N. W. 376, 40 L. R. A. (N. S.) 898; See also,
Horton v. Old Colony Bill Posting Co., (1914) 36 R. I. 507.
19. (1914) 263 Ill. 368, 105 N. E. 315, L. R. A. 1915 D 607.
20. (1915) 266 Ill. 365, 107 N. E. 636.
21. (1899) 174 Mass. 476, 55 N. E. 77, 47 L. R. A. 314.
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height of buildings on and near Copley Square, in the city of
Boston," was held constitutional. While this case was based
upon the use of eminent domain for the restriction yet the
suggestion was made that esthetic considerations might eriter
into and be one of the reasons for the taking.
In the case of Welch v. Swasey12 the Supreme Court of
the United States held:
"Where the highest court of the state has held that there is
reasonable ground for classification between the commercial
and residential portions of a city as to the height of buildings,
based on practical and not aesthetic grounds, and that the
police power is not to be exercised for merely aesthetic
purposes, this court will not hold that such a statute, upheld
by the state court, prescribing different heights in different
sections of the city is unconstitutional as discriminating
against, and denying equal protection of the law to, the own-
ers of property in the district where the lower height is pre-
scribed.
"Where there is justification for the enactment of a police
statute limiting the height of buildings in a particular district,
an owner of property in that district is not entitled to com-
pensation for the reasonable interference with his property
by the statute."
Here the reader will again observe that the most liberal in-
terpretation was given to the constitution in support of the
right of the state to legislate upon any subject involving the
public welfare.
In the case of Noble State Bank v. Haskell,2 3 the same
court says: "The police power extends to all great public
needs." In the case of Bacon v. Walker,24 it held that the
police power of the state embraces regulations designed to
promote the public convenience and general prosperity as well
as those to promote public health, morals and safety. It is not
confined to the suppression of what is offensive, disorderly or
unsanitary, but extends to what is for the greatest welfare of
the state.
In the case of Eubank v. Richmond,25 in considering the
constitutionality of an ordinance requiring the committee on
streets, upon the request of two-thirds of the owners of the
22. (1909) 214 U. S. 91, 29 S. "C. R. 567.
23. (1911) 219 U. S. 104 and 575, 31 S. C. R. 299.
24. (1907) 204 U. S. 311, 27 S. C. R. 289. See, also, Schmidinger v.
Chicago, (1913) 226 U. S. 578, 33 S. C. R. 182, Ann. Cas. 1914 B 284.
25. (1913) 226 U. S. 137, 33 S. C. R. 76, Ann. Cas. 1914 B 192.
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abutting property, to establish a building line in the city of
Richmond, the United Sates Supreme Court said:
"Whether it is a valid exercise of the police power is the
question in the case, and that power we have defined, as far as
it is capable of being defined by general words, a number of
times. It is not susceptible of circumstantial precision. It ex-
tends as we have said, not only to regulations which promote
the public health, morals and safety, but to those which pro-
mote the public convenience or the general prosperity. C. B. &
Q. Ry. Co. v. Drainage Commissioners, 200 U. S. 561. And
further, it is the most essential of powers, at times the most
insistent, and always one of the least limitable of the powers
of government. District of Columbia v. Brooke, 214 U. S. 138,
149. But necessarily it.has its limits and must stop when it
encounters the prohibitions of the constitution. A clash will
not, however, be lightly inferred. Governmental power must
be flexible and adaptive. Exigencies arise, or even conditions
less peremptory, which may call for or suggest legislation, and
it may be a struggle in judgment to decide whether it must
yield to the higher considerations expressed and determined
by the provisions of the constitution. Noble State Bank v. Has-
kell, 219 U. S. 104. The point where particular interests or
principles balance 'cannot be determined by a general formula
in advance.' Hudson Water Co. v. McCarter, 209 U. S. 349,
355."
The case of Hadacheck v. Los Angeles, hereinbefore cited,
was taken to the Supreme Court of the United States, and that
court unreservedly approved the holding of the supreme court
of California,28 and therein gave perhaps the most liberal in-
terpretation of our constitution that has yet been given it in
a very extended and thorough discussion of the subject, after
citation of numerous authorities. The court said:
"While the police power of the state cannot be so arbitrarily
exercised as to deprive persons of their property without due
process of law or deny them equal protection of the law, it is
one of the most essential powers of government and one of
the least limitable-in fact the imperative necessity for its
existence precludes any limitation upon it when not arbitrarily
exercised.
"There must be progress, and in its march private interests
must yield to the good of the community.
"The police power may be exercised under some conditions
to declare that under particular*circumstances and in particu-
lar localities specified businesses which are not nuisances per
26. (1915) 239 U. S. 394, 36 S. C. R. 143.
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se (such as livery stables, as in Reininan v. Little Rock, 237
U. S. 171, and brickyards, as in this case) are to be deemed
nuisance in fact and law."
We anticipate that the reader, after this citation of authori-
ties, will immediately ask, what is the rule for determining the
validity of legislative enactments passed in the exercise
of the police power? The rule seems to be very clearly stated
in the recent case of State ex rel. Lachtman v. Houghton,2 7 in
the following syllabus by the court:
"The use which the owner may make of his property is
subject to any reasonable restrictions and regulations, im-
posed by the legislative power, which tend to promote the pub-
lic welfare or to secure to others the rightful use and enjoy-
ment of their own property; but only such use of property as
may produce injurious consequences, or infringe the lawful
rights of others, can be prohibited without violating the con-
stitutional provisions that the owner shall not be deprived of
his property without due process of law, nor without compen-
sation first paid or secured."
This case was decided by the supreme court of Minnesota
adversely to the power of the legislature to prohibit a store
building in a particular locality, and was based to some extent
on a similar decision in the state of Illinois prohibiting a store
building in a certain locality. This, then, establishes a rule
apparently as definite as a rule can be, but query, What use
is a use that produces injurious consequences to others or
infringes the lawful rights of others? The court in this case
said that the building of a store building did not produce
injurious consequences, did not infringe the rights of others.
The court said the same thing in the Illinois case, but is it not
somewhat hard to distinguish this case from the case of a
brickyard or the case of a public garage? The court has
drawn a line of distinction between legislation, regulating and
prohibiting the manufacture and sale of intoxicating liquor,
regulating the location of slaughter houses, tanneries, soap
factories, laundries, brickyards, lumber yards, public garages,
and stables on the one hand, and legislation regulating the
location of a mercantile establishment on the other.
We do not question in this article the justice of such a
decision, but has it not left the layman and the person inter-
ested in public and civic development in a quandary as to the
limits of the legislative power?
27. (1916) 134 Minn..--, 158 N. W. 1017.
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Various legislatures throughout the United States have re-
cently passed acts providing for the districting of municipali-
ties. The ordinances of the city of Los Angeles involved in
the California cases cited were passed pursuant to legislative
enactment. Such acts have been adopted in Illinois, in Minne-
sota, in Pennsylvania, in New York, in Maryland, evidencing
unquestionably the great public demand for civic development.
In the state of New York a legislative act was passed author-
izing the appointment of a commission to redistrict the city
of Greater New York. The commission, after many months
of labor, made its report upon conditions in that city. They
took evidence from authorities upon public health, from police
commissioners, physicians and real estate men, evidence that
established beyond question that the districting of a municipal-
ity into residence and business districts, however intricate
and complex, would unquestionably promote the public health,
morals, welfare and general prosperity. The evidence adduced
before them showed that the presence of business houses in
a residence district increased liability to street accidents -and
was to some extent a menace to health; that the encroachment
of business districts upon valuable residence properties, ma-
terially affected property values; that the regulation of resi-
dences as to their size, the number of families permitted in
each, the building of apartment houses, etc., unquestionably
affected the public health and morals. Evidence was intro-
duced from German cities of the very satisfactory results of
legislation providing for more adequate housing for German
laborers, and for single residences for laborers and their fami-
lies, instead of the old congested conditions present when they
were housed in tenements and apartment houses.
The findings of the New York commission will undoubtedly
be brought to the attention of the New York court of appeals
in subsequent litigation, and probably later to that of the Su-
preme Court of the United States; and we cannot but feel that
they will probably be given the sanction of the approval of
these courts. The difficulty of excluding the esthetic consid-
eration from the exercise of the police power is very plain for
the reason that however the court may term a consideration
esthetic, that consideration can be definitely traced to the
general welfare. Anything that beautifies a neighborhood
enhances the value of property; anything that spoils or mars
the beauty of a neighborhood depreciates the value of prop-
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erty. The result, then, becomes not esthetic, as the courts
have chosen to term it, but economic, and anything that is
economic certainly must be considered in promoting the gen-
eral welfare.
If in the development of the police power in protecting pub-
lic health, morals, welfare, convenience and prosperity a point
has been reached where legislatures must stop, and the
encroachment of such businesses as legislatures and munic-
ipal councils are now attempting to restrain cannot be so pre-
vented, and if such restriction in certain districts will unques-
tionably promote the public welfare, the question arises, How
can we secure the result?
In Minnesota, in the year 1915, the legislature passed an
act providing for the districting of cities under the power of
eminent domain. We believe that this act, if its terms are
compiled with and due notice given, opportunity to be heard
had, compensation given when persons affected are damaged,
will be upheld by the courts. Its operation will unquestion-
ably be intricate and complex, but it may ultimately secure the
desired results.
The alternative is the giving of complete effect by the
courts to the rule of the majority, even though incidental dam-
age to the individual may result. While this subject is, per-
haps, not so vital as some other subjects of government, yet its
decision must ultimately follow the theory of our govern-
ment, as the courts will be unquestionably called upon in the
future further to pronounce it. If our government progresses
by the construction of the courts to a complete rule of the
majority, every individual in the government must submit
his individual conduct and life to the rule of the majority and
to the benefit and common good of all the people. While such
a result will be revolutionary of the ideas of some of our peo-
ple as to the rights and liberties they possess, yet such a prog-
ress is possible.
It is undoubtedly a very satisfying sensation for many in-
dividuals to feel that when they have acquired a title to prop-
erty under our system, they have the absolute and unqualified
right in perpetuity to occupy and use it in any way they see
fit, unhampered and unruled by their neighbors or the com-
munity, even though that use damage and mar the beauty and
depreciate the value of surrounding property. If the courts
construe our constitutions so as to preserve this individuality
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of person and of ownership, it seems that a serious impediment
to civic progress is possible. Personally we believe that this is
a representative government wherein we have agreed, by
adopting our constitutions, to abide by the laws which our
representatives pass, and if those laws are for the benefit of
the majority, our individual interests must bend to the will of
the majority and to common good.
We cannot hope definitely to stop the enterprising spirit of
gain. It is insistently active in engendering distinctions calcu-
lated to elude, impair and undermine the fairest and proudest
models of legislation, but by the gradual progress and evolu-
tion of law we can restrict its harmful effects.
R. S. WIGGIN.*
Minneapolis.
*Assistant City Attorney of Minneapolis.
